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Während der bevorstehende Brexit, also der Austritt des Vereinigten Königreiches aus der Europäischen Union, in den
meisten anderen Rechtsgebieten eine große Herausforderung darstellt, wurden die Folgen des Brexit für das Umweltrecht
zunächst optimistischer beurteilt – auch während der Anhörungen im House of Lords. Einige Umweltschützer haben
öffentlich die Auffassung vertreten, dass das Vereinigte Königreich strengere Umweltschutzstandards erlassen könnte,
die sich zudemdurch eine größere Sachgerechtigkeit auszeichnen könnten, insbesondere in denBereichen Landwirtschaft
undFischerei. Nachdemdie jetzigeRegierung nunaber eine „harte“ Version des Brexit angekündigt hat,mit demErgebnis,
dass das Vereinigte Königreich durch nicht viel mehr als vielleicht einem Freihandelsabkommen mit dem Rest Europas
verbunden sein wird, wird der Deregulierungsdruck für die Zeit nach dem Brexit deutlich ansteigen. Das lässt eine
Absenkung der britischen Umweltstandards erwarten. Der nachstehende Beitrag versucht, die rechtlichen und politischen
Erwägungen zu bewerten, die der Brexit unter Berücksichtigung internationaler Umweltverpflichtungen, insbesondere
im Zusammenhang mit dem Klimawandel, notwendig macht. Wir halten es für wahrscheinlich, dass sich der Traum von
einemgrünerenGroßbritannien „post-Brexit“aufgrunddesde-regulatorischenDrucks inLuftauflösenwird.Optimistischer
vertreten wir die Ansicht, dass die auswärtige Dimension der EU-Umweltvorschriften, wie etwa die Anwendung
Europäischer Produktregeln, in den meisten für den Warenhandel relevanten Bereichen das britische Umweltrecht auf
absehbare Zeit bestimmen könnte, wenn das Vereinigte Königreich weiterhin mit der EU Handel zu treiben beabsichtigt.
I. Introduction
Concern over the inevitable lowering of UK environmental
standards or even the demise of regulation in some areas fol-
lowing the Brexit vote was immediate, and not without rea-
son.1 While much remains in flux and will probably depend
on the eventual Art. 50 TEU deal between the UK and EU-27,
an area most important for environmental progress and col-
lective action, climate change, is most likely not an area where
the UK will aim its potential de-regulation efforts. In many
ways, climate changeas a crosscuttingpolicydriver transcends
European Union (EU) membership, having broad impacts on
trade, finance, and product flows, will heavily influence the
post-Brexit environmental roadmap. This article argues that
Brexit will have a largely negative impact on environmental
law. Regulatory pressures as per the pursued worldwide trade
liberalisation agenda of the current government or backlash
when exporters will have to comply with EU standards, de-
spite lack ofUK influence, couldmake it harderwithin theUK
to agree new laws. More optimistically if a continued trading
relationship with EU-27 is wanted, the external dimension of
EU environmental law could have a lasting impact in theUK.2
First, general considerations relating to trade and com-
mon socio-economic factors are summarized (infra II.). Se-
cond, the EU legislative framework is outlined highlighting
the scope and basis of environmental governance (III.).
Third, the breadth of EU influence onUKdomestic environ-
mental law is analyzed and post-Brexit challenges identified
(IV.). Finally, the interface of climate change and UK envi-
ronmental law is explored to illustrate key challenges (V.).
Much like the early pillars underlying the common mar-
ket were grounded in a recognition of the need to cooper-
ate on issues of mutual interest, the commanding heights
of the economy will heavily influence post-Brexit UK envi-
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environmental regulationsafterBrexit”, TheGuardian (31 January2017),
online: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/31/european
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2 E. Morgera ed, The external environmental policy of the European
Union: EU and international law perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012).
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ronmental law invariably requiringpolicy stability, effective
enforcement, and continued influence in environmental re-
forms relating to shared natural resources.
II. General Considerations
Environmental governance requires cooperation and cohe-
sive legislative and policy action at the national, regional,
and international level. Early overtures of cooperation un-
derpinning the creation of the EU were grounded in similar
principles of economic integration, but were initially silent
on environmental policy.3 The Treaty of Rome which estab-
lished the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957,
while lacking direct reference to environmental governance,
provided flexibility through Article 235 EEC (now Article
352 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) for
the passage of “appropriate measures” to attain one of the
objectives of the Community.4 Early legislation, Directive
67/548 addressing the packaging and labeling of dangerous
substances,5 and Directive 70/157 pertaining to the exhaust
systems of motorized vehicles,6were principally focused on
economic integration, and addressed environmental out-
comes as a secondary if not tertiary aspect. Following the
1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,7
and the growing recognition of the need for cooperative ac-
tion tosustainablymanageecosystems, furthereffortswhere
made under provisions relating to the functions of the com-
monmarket toaddress leadcontent ingasoline,8detergents,9
exhaust systems,10 aquatic pollution,11 air pollution andhaz-
ards relating to industrial facilities,12 and toxic waste.13
Adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 saw inclu-
sion of an explicit legal basis for governance of environmen-
tal matters through a supranational approach.14 Whereby
previously, environmental legislation was passed pursuant
to powers relating to essential objectives of the Communi-
ty and subsequently confirmed by the Court,15 integration
of Article 130 r-t of the SEA (now Article 191-192 under the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) provided
a clear legal basis for environmental governance and most
importantly legislated guiding principles for environmen-
tal action of the Union. Subsequent developments under
the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997), increased the prominence of environmental factors
positioning economic integration in the context of sustain-
able development and increased environmental protec-
tion.16 The principle of subsidiarity provides for the devel-
opment of Community-wide policy in cases where action
by a single Member State would be insufficient, or better
achieved through action by theCommunity.17Prioritization
of policy harmonization to address transnational issues –
in the environmental context include: transboundary envi-
ronmental pollution (both air and water), global climate
change, andpreservation of biodiversity – practically aimed
to foster social cohesion, provide for balanced competition,
and minimize market distortions on trade.18 Jointly the
3 M. Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making 2nd
ed. (London: Hart Publishing, 2014) at 2 [Lee]; Jan H. Jans & Hans H.
B. Vedder, European Environmental Law 3rd ed. (Groningen: Europa
Law Publishing, 2008) at 3 [Jans & Vedder].
4 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Rome,
25 March 1957, Article 235, online: http://ec.europa.eu/economy
_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf, [Treaty of
Rome, EEC]; Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the EuropeanCommunity, Lisbon, 17 De-
cember 2007, OJ C 306/1, Article 308 [Treaty of Lisbon, TEU]; Consol-
idated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
26 October 2012, OJ C 326/47, Article 352. [TFEU]
5 EC,Directive67/548relating to theclassification,packaging,and labelling
of dangerous substances, OJ 1967 L 196/1, online: http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31967L0548:EN:HTML.
6 EC, Directive 70/157 relating to the permissible sound level and the ex-
haust system of motor vehicles, OJ 1970 L 42/16, online: http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31970L0157.
7 UN, “Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment” (16 June
1972), online: http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default
.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 [Stockholm Declaration].
8 EC, Directive 85/210 concerning the lead content of petrol, OJ 1985 L
96/25, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri
=CELEX:31985L0210:EN:HTML.
9 EC, Directive 73/404 relating to detergents, OJ 1973 L 347/51, online:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
31973L0404:EN:HTML.
10 Directive 70/157, supra note 6; EC, Directive 78/1015 on the permissible
sound level and exhaust system ofmotorcycles OJ 1978 L 349/21, online:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31978L1015.
11 EC, Directive 76/464 on pollution caused by certain dangerous sub-
stances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community,
OJ 1976 L 129/23, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31976L0464.
12 EC, Directive 84/360 on the combating of air pollution from industrial
plants, OJ 1984 L 188/20, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal
-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31984L0360; EC, Directive 82/501
on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities, OJ 1982
L 230/1, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri
=CELEX%3A31982L0501.
13 EC, Directive 78/319 on toxic and dangerous waste, OJ 1978 L 84/43,
online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX
%3A31978L0319.
14 Lee, supra note 3, at 1, 3.
15 Commission v Italy, Case 92/79 (1980) ECR 1115; Procureur de la
République v Association de Défense des Brûleurs d’huiles Usagées,
C-240/83 (1985) ECR 531, [ADBHU].
16 Treaty of the European Union, signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992,
29 July 1992 OJ C 191/01, Article 2-3, 130 r-t, online: http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:1992:191:FULL
&from=EN, [Treaty of Maastricht]; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
Treaty of European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Com-
munities and Certain Related Acts, 10 November 1997, OJ C 340/1, Ar-
ticle 2-3, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri
=uriserv:OJ.C_.1997.340.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:1997:340:TOC
[Treaty of Amsterdam].
17 Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 15, Article 3b; Treaty of Lisbon, supra
note 4, Article 5.
18 Jans & Vedder, supra note 3, at 10-13.
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principle of integration calling for environmental protec-
tion to be incorporated into broader Community policies,19
and subsidiarity, endeavor to balance policy development
recognizing the interconnection of the European environ-
ment providing for cohesive frameworks governing among
others, agriculture, transport, energy, habitats, and wild
birds.20
The EU Environmental Action Programme (EAP), first
established in1972 following theStockholmDeclarationand
nowon its seventh iteration,21has developed to cooperative-
ly actualize core treaty principles including the precaution-
ary principle, the concept of sustainable development, and
environmental prioritization in policy-making. Even during
the early stages, cooperation was identified as an essential
element given global economic interdependence.22 The re-
sulting patchwork of laws relating to the environment de-
velopedovernearly fivedecadesof experience, andenforced
by a highly-evolved system of EU institutions, presents a
range of complexities for repatriation and administration
of environmental policy within the UK post-Brexit.23While
the recent House of Lord’s EU Committee report doubted
that the UKwould opt to lower its own environmental stan-
dards, the Lords in our view rightly highlighted the impend-
ing enforcement deficit, if the UK does not rapidly establish
significant regulatory and enforcement capacity.24 The role
of the ECJ was highlighted by the Lords as a key institution
responsible for significant progress in the environmental
field.25
Climate change, as an inherently international challenge,
similarly amplifies the complications inherent with a sug-
gested disentanglement. The EU has since EAP 3
(1982–1986) and EAP 4 (1987–1992) stressed the need for
policy integration and harmonization, particularly in foster-
ing sustainable development, and reductions in CO2 emis-
sions.26 It is hoped, though it remains to be seen if contin-
ued efforts by the UK to address climate change post-Brex-
it, notwithstanding ongoing international obligations and
continued access to the European market, will be pursued,
in order to maintain a high degree of policy stability and
continued alignment with policy efforts at the supranation-
al level.
III. Legislative Framework
Where early environmental legislation was grounded in
achieving the objectives of the common market, the inclu-
sion of explicit powers relating to environmental policy de-
velopment in the SEA galvanized decision-making priori-
ties. The legal basis for coordination of environmental pro-
tection at the EU level maintained a level of stability follow-
ing the 2007 signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered
into force in 2009, establishing the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU),27 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU).28 Key environmental provisions
found in Article 130 r-t of the SEA remained included in the
TFEU reinforcing the prominence of harmonized environ-
mental governance.
Article 191 TFEU establishes the objectives and scope
governing the environmental policy of the EU. Environ-
mental policy functions to: preserve and improve environ-
mental quality, protect human health, promote rational use
of natural resources, and promote international measures
to address environmental problems including climate
change.29 Policy decisions are to foster a high level of envi-
ronmental protection, consider national differences, and be
grounded in the precautionary and polluter pays princi-
ples.30 In establishing environmental policy key factors in-
clude: use of available scientific data, recognition of envi-
ronmental considerations of other regions in the EU, iden-
tification of protentional costs and benefits of both action
and procrastination, as well as the balanced economic and
social development across the EU.31 Additionally, both the
EU and individual Member States should cooperate with
19 Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 16, Article 130r.
20 Jans & Vedder, supra note 3, at 16-17.
21 EC, Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the
representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in
the Council of 22 November 1973 on the programme of action of the
European Communities on the environment, OJ C112/1 (20.12.1973),
online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:
1973:112:FULL&from=EN [1st EAP]; EC, Decision No 1386/2013/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013
on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living
well, within the limits of our planet’ OJ L 354/171 (28.12.2013), online:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
32013D1386&from=EN, [7th EAP].
22 Ibid, 1st EAP, para 8.
23 House of Lords, “Brexit: environment and climate change” HL Paper
109, European Union Committee 12th Report of Session 2016-17 (14
February 2017), at 54, online: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/109/109.pdf, [HL Report].
24 Ibid.
25 Alec Stone Sweet & Markus Gehring, “Environmental Protection” in A.
Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2004) at 228-232.
26 Christian Hey, “EU Environmental Policies: A short history of the poli-
cy strategies” in Stefan Scheuer (ed), EU Environmental Policy Hand-
book: A Critical Analysis of EU Environmental Legislation (Utrecht,
Netherlands: European Environmental Bureau and International Books,
2005), at 19-22.
27 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 26 October
2012, OJ C 326/13, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri
=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_1
&format=PDF, [TEU].
28 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 4; TFEU, supra note 4.
29 TFEU, supra note 4, Article 191(1).
30 Ibid, TFEU, Article 191(2).
31 Ibid, TFEU, Article 191(3).
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relevant jurisdictions and international organizations, sub-
ject to agreement, provided they comply with the EU
treaties.32 It must also be noted that the Court of Justice,
particularly in the ATAA decision, gave EU legislators the
competence to regulate environmental problems outside
the application of the Treaties, if these impact on the EU it-
self.33
Any hope about an impending environmental paradise
post-Brexit in Britain is largely tempered by the fact that
thus far the UK had never adopted more stringent environ-
mental measures. Unlike in many other fields, Article 193
authorises Member States to establish more stringent pro-
tectivemeasures,34when implementing environmental pol-
icy at the national level.35 This domestic deference allowing
for higher levels of ambition is rarely used and arguably the
UK did not need Brexit to establish stricter environmental
laws.
Several prominent ECJ decisions have influenced and
evolved EU environmental law. The passing of Directive
75/439 on waste oils, which required Member States to es-
tablish measures for the “safe collection and disposal of
waste oils” with a preference for recycling, and Directive
75/442onwastedisposalmorebroadly,36 createdaperceived
conflict between environmentally sound waste oil disposal
and the “free movement” of an exchangeable good. The
Court in Inter-Huiles reviewed the French system which in
effect inhibited the export of waste oil, finding that Mem-
ber States cannot organize a disposal system in a trade re-
strictiveway.37This holdingwas reaffirmed inmultiple sub-
sequent cases.38 In ADBHU the Court was asked to consider
the balancing of general interests – including free move-
ment of goods, competition, and trade – in relation to envi-
ronmental protection, holding that general interests were
not absolute and must be seen in the context of the essen-
tial objective of environmental protection.39
The balancing of the EU interests with the autonomy of
Member States has been a central theme of environment ju-
risprudence. In Danish Bottles the court considered a Dan-
ish beverage container preapproval process which provid-
ed an exception for imported test products, and a quantita-
tive limitation on unapproved containers of 3,000 hec-
tolitres (hl) per annum.40 Following the holding in ADBHU,
the Court noted that environmental protection was an es-
sential objective which could justify a trade-distorting bot-
tle deposit-and-return system, but held that the preapproval
processwas discriminatory as it disallowotherwise reusable
containers,41 in effect placing aproportionality test on trade-
distorting environmental measures. In Commission v Bel-
gium the Court considered a Belgian prohibition on the
dumping or storage of foreign or domestic waste in the re-
gion of Wallonia, but for waste originating in that region.42
Curiously, while the Court noted the measure openly dis-
criminated against imports, themeasure was upheld as hav-
ing a clear objective to protect human health and the envi-
ronment,43 reinforcing the prominence of domestic envi-
ronmental protection measures.
With the expansionofEUenvironmental regulatorypow-
ers came an increased need for the Court to interpret statu-
tory purpose, scope, and definitions. A wide range of cases,
often bringing about submissions from multiple Member
States, focused on clarifying if the definition of “waste” in-
cluded reusable goods of economic value.44 Illustrative of
this trend, inCommission v Germany the Court reviewed the
German legislationwhich exempted several categories of re-
cyclable waste, finding this approach violated the EU-wide
single definition of “waste.”45 In Lappel Bank the Court had
32 Ibid, TFEU, Article 191(4).
33 M. Gehring, "Air Transport Association of America v. Energy Secretary:
Clarifying Direct Effect and Providing Guidance for Future Instrument
Design for a Green Economy in the European Union." Review of Euro-
pean Community & International Environmental Law 21.2 (2012):
149-54.
34 TFEU, supra note 4, Article 193.
35 Ibid, TFEU, Article 258.
36 EC, Council Directive 75/439/EEC of 16 June 1975 on the disposal of
waste oil, OJ L 194/23, 25.07.1975 (1975); EC, Council Directive
75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste, OJ L 194/39, 25.07.1975 (1975).
37 Syndicat national des fabricants raffineurs d'huile de graissage and oth-
ers v Groupement d'intérêt économique "Inter-Huiles" and others, ECJ
172/82 (1983), [Inter-Huiles].
38 Groupement d'Intérêt Economique "Rhône-Alpes Huiles" and others v
Syndicat National des Fabricants Raffineurs d'Huile de Graissage and
others, ECJ 295/82 (1984) [Rhônes-Alpes Huiles]; Criminal proceedings
against José Vanacker and André Lesage and SA Baudoux combustibles,
ECJ C-37/92 (1993) [Vanacker]; Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp BV
and Others v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en
Milieubeheer, ECJ C-203/96 (1998) [Chemische Afvalstoffen]; Entre-
prenørforeningens Affalds/Miljøsektion (FFAD) v Københavns Kom-
mune, ECJ C-209/98 (2000), [FFAD].
39 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs
d'huiles usagées (ADBHU), ECJ 240/83 (1985). [ADBHU]
40 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark, ECJ
302/86 (1988), [Danish Bottles].
41 Ibid, Danish Bottles, at para 20-22.
42 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, ECJ
C-2/90 (1992), [Commission v. Belgium].
43 Ibid, Commission v. Belgium, at para 50.
44 Criminal proceedings against Euro Tombesi and Adino Tombesi
(C-304/94), Roberto Santella (C-330/94), Giovanni Muzi and others
(C-342/94) and Anselmo Savini (C-224/95) (joined), ECJ C-304/94
(1997) [Tombesi]; Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région wal-
lonne, ECJ C-129/96 (1997) [Inter-Environnement Wallonie]; ARCO
Chemie Nederland Ltd v Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Or-
dening en Milieubeheer (C-418/97) and Vereniging Dorpsbelang Hees,
Stichting Werkgroep Weurt+ and Vereniging Stedelijk Leefmilieu Ni-
jmegen v Directeur van de dienst Milieu en Water van de provincie
Gelderland (C-419/97) (joined), ECJ C418/97 (2000) [Arco Chemie];
The Queen, on the application of Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd, v Environ-
ment Agency and Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions, and Corus (UK) Ltd and Allied Steel and Wire Ltd (ASW),
ECJ C-444/00 (2003), [Mayer Perry].
45 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Ger-
many, ECJ C-422/92 (1995), [Commission v Germany].
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to strike a balance between ecological and economic inter-
ests in the context of the Birds Directive (79/409) and Habi-
tats Directive (92/43) when considering the permissibility
of a dike and reservoir adjacent to a protected area.46 Con-
cluding theworkswere justified on public interests grounds
as they improved the ecological situationby effectivelyman-
aging flooding, the Court following Leybucht Dykes cau-
tioned that while economic justification cannot be utilized
in the establishment of a protected area, it could be consid-
ered in exceptional circumstances when encroaching upon
the ecosystem.47 Similarly, in Santoña Marshes the Court
noted that Member States were under an obligation to treat
waste in such a way as to ensure economic operations did
not adversely impact protected areas,48 clearly positioning
environmental interests above economic. Overall, the Court
has supported EU environmental measures, favoring har-
monization and supranational governance with exceptions
grounded proportionally, and economic influences posi-
tioned ancillary to the essential objective of environmental
protection.
IV. Brexit and EU Environmental Legislation
While deference is given to Member States relating to the
method of implementation, nearly five decades of EU en-
vironmental legislation has had a profound influence on
the substantive and procedural evolution of domestic law
in the UK. Crucial legislation developed relating to habi-
tats,49 migratory birds,50 air quality,51 water resources and
waste management,52 commercial trade in chemicals,53
and emissions trading,54 along with common sectoral poli-
cies (ie. agriculture and fisheries),55 are cornerstones of
both supranational and domestic environmental action.
The full breadth and depth of the EU environmental ac-
quis is difficult to fully ascertain, with over 200 purely en-
vironmental instruments in place at the EU level, exclud-
ing internal market aspects – such as product standards
and labelling, governance of agriculture, fisheries, and en-
ergy sectors – where Member States have shared compe-
tency; when areas of shared competency are included, over
1100 pieces of directly applicable legislation can be identi-
fied as falling under the remit of the UK Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).56Overall EU
environmental and climate legislation, policies, and ju-
risprudence are deeply embedded into the corpus of UK
environmental law, with the task of directly transposing
the entirety of the framework into domestic law a daunt-
ing and complex affair. It is thus not surprising that the
UK under the previous coalition government concluded in
a balance of competence review, that by and large the EU
possessed the right competences in this field and if any-
46 Regina v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte: Royal Society
for the Protection of Birds, ECJ C-44/95 (1996), [Lappel Bank].
47 Ibid, Lappel Bank, at para 41-42.
48 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain, ECJ
C-355/90 (1993), at para 53-56, [Santoña Marshes].
49 EC, Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natur-
al habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206/7 (22.7.1992), online:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
31992L0043&from=EN, [Habitats Directive].
50 EC, Directive 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild
birds, OJ L 103/1 (25.4.1979); EC, Directive 2009/147/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the con-
servation of wild birds, OJ L 20/7 (26.01.2010), online: http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0147&from
=EN, [Birds Directive].
51 EC, Directive 1008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe,
OJ L 152/1 (11.6.2008), [Air Quality Directive].
52 EC, Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 23 October 2000 establishinga framework for Community action
in the field of water policy, OJ L 327/1 (22.12.2000), online: http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:5c835afb-2ec6-4577-bdf8
-756d3d694eeb.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF, [Water Policy Direc-
tive]; EC, Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain Direc-
tives, OJ L 312/3 (22.11.2008), online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal
-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008L0098&from=EN, [Waste Di-
rective].
53 Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a Eu-
ropeanChemicals Agency, amendingDirective 1999/45/EC and repeal-
ing Council Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation
(EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Com-
missionDirectives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC,
OJ L 396/1 (30.12.2006) [REACH].
54 EC, Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 13 October 2003 establishinga scheme for greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading within the Community and amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275/32 (25.11.2003), online: http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003L0087&from
=EN, [EU ETS Directive].
55 EC, Regulation (EU) 2015/812 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 May 2015 amending Council Regulations (EC) No
850/98, (EC) No 2187/2005, (EC) No 1967/2006, (EC) No 1098/2007,
(EC) No 254/2002, (EC) No 2347/2002 and (EC) No 1224/2009, and
Regulations (EU) No 1379/2013 and (EU) No 1380/2013 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council, as regards the landing obligation,
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98, OJ L 133/1
(29.5.2015), online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.133.01.0001.01.ENG [Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP)]; EC, Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rur-
al development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Devel-
opment (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No
1698/2005, OJ L 347/487 (20.12.2013), online: http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1305&from=en.
See also: EC, Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013, OJ L 347/549
(20.12.2013); EC, Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013, OJ L 347/608
(20.12.2013); EC, Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, OJ L 347/671
(20.12.2013).
56 HL Report, supra note 23, at 9-10.
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thing was perhaps lacking further competences in the field
of climate change.57
A crucial aspect of the common andharmonized environ-
mental framework is to maintain a level playing field for in-
tra-Union trade while balancing the costs and benefits of
administration. The EUmarket, accounting for 23.8%of the
€58.7 trillion global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014,58
has benefited from the stability, continuity, and climate-fo-
cused long-term perspective of regulations driving innova-
tion and creating sufficient critical mass to allow for broad
development and deployment of low carbon technologies.59
Rather than a higher level of environmental protection,
Brexit is seen by some (many Brexiteers are also incidental-
ly climate change deniers)60 as an easy way to lower the ad-
ministrative burden of compliance – particularly organiza-
tional protocols, permitting, reporting, and data sharing—
with EU environmental and climate legislation.
Following the Brexit vote, Prime Minister Theresa May
announced plans to introduce a “Great Repeal Bill” which
would repeal the European Communities Act 1972,61 and
transpose EU law into the domestic law of the UK in accor-
dance with bilateral and multilateral agreements.62 Sugges-
tion of such a “continuance” while desirable to foster con-
tinued market stability, also raises several challenges. First,
decisions and regulations as direct-effect legislation are
more direct to transpose than directives which require en-
abling legislation. For instance, the REACH framework
would be directly applicable, while conservation measures
under the Habitat Directive would need legislative imple-
mentation leaving potential room to maneuver. Second,
wide use of “legislation by reference,” or legislation which
utilizes a definition or mechanism from another piece of
legislation through direct integration, provides a range of
unique complexities. For example, Section 75 of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act 1990 integrates definitions of
“waste” and “hazardous waste” from the Waste Framework
Directive, and theHazardousWasteDirective respectively.63
Third, coreobligationsanddefinitionshaveevolved through
interpretation and application of the ECJ. Admittedly uncer-
tainty remains to the specific way past ECJ jurisprudence
will be incorporated into the common law on Brexit day
with the UK Supreme Court in Miller concluding judge-
ments would be nomore then “persuasive.”64One commen-
tator noted the potential for an interpretive approachwhich
would allow UK courts to interpret and develop domestic
law in accordance with the law of the EU.65Moving forward
as the corpus of EU law would no longer be supreme yet
would continue to evolve divergence poses a risk to compli-
ance terms for continued market access.66 Fourth, where
previously the ECJ and EU institutions played integral roles
in maintaining compliance of Member States and domestic
actors, Brexit leaves a gap in access to forums for account-
ability for national measures; a void which UK courts will
struggle to fill adequately. Fifth, the departure from the EU
will include restrictions on access to funding programs sup-
porting legislative implementation, research, and innova-
tion. Sixth, any potential trade agreement with the EU will
include compliance with many environmental and market
standards, such as REACH utilized by partners in Asia and
North America. The UKmay practically be required to com-
ply with the EU environmental framework to maintain
trade-flows without the ability to influence legal develop-
ment going forward. Finally, the government has made the
comment that ministers will be allowed to unilaterally
change or rescind EU laws under this “Great Repeal Bill”.
While it is constitutionally very doubtful if such far reach-
ing authorisations could be given, it is clear that while some
continuity is intended,manyparts of EU environmental law
not currently transposed into UK law, could face govern-
mental repeal.
It should be noted that vast differences in environmen-
tal standards would not be acceptable to UK trading part-
ners in the future. While the WTO allows for certain vari-
ants in this regard, its aim remains a level playing field for
international trade. Under the SPS and the TBT agree-
ment,67many international standards becomede factobind-
ing and if there is scientific proof for higher EU standards,
those could also be justified, further increasing the regula-
tory pressure on the post-Brexit UK to comply with EU en-
vironmental law.
57 Government of the UK, “Review of the Balance of Competences be-
tween the United Kingdom and the European Union: Environment and
Climate Change (February 2014), (National Archives, Government of
UK), at para 2.13-2.18, online: https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284500/environment
-climate-change-documents-final-report.pdf, [Balance of Compe-
tences, 2014].
58 Eurostat, The EU in the World: 2016 Edition (Luxembourg: Publications
Office of the European Union, 2016), at 79, online: http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/documents/3217494/7589036/KS-EX-16-001-EN-N.pdf/
bcacb30c-0be9-4c2e-a06d-4b1daead493e.
59 Balance of Competences, 2014, supra note 57, at para 2.13-2.18.
60 James Crisp, “Brexit campaign leadership dominated by climate-scep-
tics” EurActiv 24 May 2016, online: https://www.euractiv.com/section/
uk-europe/news/brexit-campaign-leadership-dominated-by-climate
-sceptics/.
61 UK, European Communities Act 1972, c-68.
62 Jack Simson Caird, “Legislating for Brexit: the Great Repeal Bill,” Brief-
ing Paper 7793 (23 February 2017) (House of Commons Library), at 8-9,
online: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP
-7793/CBP-7793.pdf, [Caird, 2017].
63 Ibid, Caird, 2017, at 33; Waste Directive, supra 52; UK, Environmental
ProtectionAct1990, c.43, Section75; EC,CouncilDirective91/689/EEC
of 12 December 1991 on hazardous waste, OJ L 377/20 (31.12.1991).
64 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Ex-
iting theEuropean Union [2017] UKSC 5, para 80.
65 T. Horsley, “UK Courts and the Great Repeal Bill – Awaiting Fresh In-
struction” U.K. Const. L. Blog (28th Feb 2017), online: https://
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/02/28/thomas-horsley-uk-courts-and
-the-great-repeal-bill-awaiting-fresh-instruction/.
66 Caird, 2017, supra note 62, at 62-63.
67 M.-C. Cordonier Segger & M. W. Gehring, Sustainable Development in
World Trade Law, vol. 9, (The Hague 2005).
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V. Climate Change and Brexit
Where overtures around the “Great Repeal Bill” raise con-
cerns around the complexity of such an undertaking, and
the potential ramifications on the domestic UK market, ex-
isting climate change obligations both internationally and
domestically perhaps show a slight silver lining of Brexit.
Commitments established by the UK and not just the EU
under the Paris Agreement (2015), the continued practical
role of the EU ETS in providing a market-measure for cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation, and domestic mea-
sures including a carbon budget and long-term reduction
targets provide cornerstones for post-Brexit environmental
priorities. Provided Brexiteering climate deniers do not as-
sume more power in the UK government, it is most likely
that the UK will remain in the EU ETS.
Grounded in international obligations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFC-
CC) and the Kyoto Protocol,68 the UK has progressively re-
duced their domestic basket of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, in 2015 totaling 495.7 million tonnes carbon dioxide
equivalent (MtCO2e) and representing a 38% reduction be-
low the 1990 baseline.69 The 2015 Paris Agreement, which
entered into force in under a year following the 21st Meeting
of the Conference of the Parties of theUNFCCC (COP 21) and
includes intended national determined contributions (IND-
Cs) submitted from 162 jurisdictions covering 190 Parties,70
establishes a global goal to reduce global temperature rise to
“well below 2 °C.”71 EU Member States collectively submit-
ted an INDC committing to a minimum reduction of GHG
emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030.72 Climate adap-
tation and mitigation measures in the EU are guided by the
EU Strategy which aims to promote Member State action,
better informed decision-making, and adaptation in vulner-
able sectors.73 Eight core actions underpin the EU Strategy
including: (i) encouragingthedevelopmentofdomesticadap-
tation strategies, (ii) providing funding for adaptation action,
(iii) localizing climate actions through the Covenant of May-
ors framework, (iv) overcoming knowledge gaps, (v) further
development ofweb resources (‘Climate-ADAPT’), (vi) adapt-
ing common policies relating to agriculture and fisheries to
climate pressures, (vii) prioritizing climate resilient infra-
structure, and (viii) promoting insurance and financial prod-
ucts which foster climate resilient investment and business
decisions.74TheHouseof LordsCommittee rightly expressed
the concern that with growing global competition, the level
of ambition concerning climate change might be lowered or
worse, some of the most integrated climate policies with the
EU repealed. The UK would probably have to submit her
own NDC post-Brexit under the Paris Agreement, and orien-
tate action in accordance with the Marrakech Action Procla-
mationagreedatCOP22.75Theratificationof theParisAgree-
ment by the UK provides prospects for hope. Such submis-
sion could be the first litmus test as to the international en-
vironmental credibility of post-Brexit Britain.
A pillar of the EU climate change framework, Directive
2003/87/EC, establishes a scheme for greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading providing a market-based mecha-
nism to positively incentivize decarbonization efforts.76The
EU ETS covers CO2, nitrous oxide (N2O), and perfluorocar-
bons (PFCs), and includes: power generation, energy inten-
sive sectors – such as oil refineries, production of various
metals, cement, glass, pulp and paper, cardboard, acids and
bulk organic chemicals – and commercial aviation originat-
ing and arriving within the European Economic Area
(EEA).77 Carbon allowances are provided by auction annu-
ally under a single EU-wide target, with a total of 2,084
MtCO2e available for fixed installations over Phase III
(2013–2020) and caps decreasing 1.74% annually.78An addi-
tional 210 MtCO2e are provided for the aviation sector.
79 Ar-
ticle 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes the importance of
carbon markets, with the EU ETS exploring steps to link
withother carbonmarketswithin theEEA (Switzerland) and
internationally (Korea, Canada, California, China). The glob-
alization of emissions trading increases the total percentage
68 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May
1992, 1771 UNTS 107, 31 ILM 849 (entered into force 21 March 1994)
[UNFCCC]; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148, 37 ILM
22 (1998) (entered into force 16 February 2005), [Kyoto Protocol].
69 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2015 UK
Greenhouse Gas Emission, Final Figures: Statistical Release: National
Statistics (7 February 2017), (National Archives, Government of UK), at
8, online: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/589825/2015_Final_Emissions_statistics.pdf [UK
Statistics 2017]; The Kyoto Protocol provides for a basket of GHGs: car-
bon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocar-
bons, sulphur hexafluoride and nitrogen trifluoride.
70 Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, 12December 2015, Decision CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9,
UNTS No. 54113 (entered into force 4 November 2016), [Paris Agree-
ment].
71 Ibid, Paris Agreement, Article 2(1).
72 EU,“IntendedNationallyDeterminedContributionof theEUand itsMem-
ber States” (6 March 2015), online: http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/
INDC/Published%20Documents/Latvia/1/LV-03-06-EU%20INDC.pdf.
73 EU, An EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change, COM(2013) 216
final (16.4.2013), at 5-9, online: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/
regdoc/rep/1/2013/EN/1-2013-216-EN-F1-1.Pdf, [EU Climate Change
Strategy].
74 Ibid.
75 UNFCCC, “Marrakech Action Proclamation for Our Climate and Sus-
tainableDevelopment”COP22, online: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action
_proclamation.pdf.
76 EU ETS Directive, supra note 54, Preamble.
77 Ibid, EU ETS Directive, Annex I-II.
78 Ibid, EU ETS Directive, Article 10; EU, “Factsheet: The EU Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS),” (September 2016), online: https://ec.europa
.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/factsheet_ets_en.pdf; EU, “Emissions cap and
allowances,” online: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap_en;
UK, The Carbon Budgets Order 2009 No 1259, Article 2, online: http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/1259/pdfs/uksi_20091259_en.pdf.
79 Ibid, Emissions cap and allowances.
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of global GDP generated under ETS compliant jurisdictions.
For example, the EU Parliament in recent weeks endorsed
the expansion of the ETS to shipping and the UK govern-
ment has been very critical of this move, potentially calling
into question its continued participation in the system.
In 2008 the UK passed the Climate Change Act with the
ambitious goal of reducing domestic GHG emissions 80%
below the 1990 baseline levels.80 The scheme, which covers
all six Kyoto GHGs,81 establishes a carbon budget for each
phase 2008–2012, 2013–2017, and 2018–22 which began at
26% below 1990 levels.82 Calculation of the carbon budget
comes from emission allowances under the EU ETS, emis-
sions not covered by the EU ETS (non-traded GHGs), and
emissions credits from other jurisdictions, with the current
carbon budget sitting at 2,782 MtCO2e and moving to 1,725
MtCO2e for the fifth phase (2028–2032).
83 Over half of the
emissions in the UK come from two sectors, energy supply
(29%) and transportation (24%).84 Sustainability focused
legislative frameworks from the EU in land use, waste man-
agement, and incorporation of renewable energy sources
have supported continued GHG emission reductions in
those sectors in the UK.85 During this time the UK econo-
my has shown continued resilience despite global econom-
ic slow-downs inparallelwith expanding climate legislation.
Over the period of 2008-2016, UK GDP has steadily grown
annually an average of 0.18%, and demonstrating the sec-
ond largest per capita income in comparison to population
size within the EU.86
VI. Brexit and the Road Ahead
Global efforts to combat anthropogenic climate change
achieved a crucial milestone at COP 21 not simply with the
2°C goal and rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement,
but through the establishment of the “Breakthrough Ener-
gy Coalition” a project spearheaded by Bill Gates to mobi-
lize investment in clean energy technologies.87 Apart from
a promising trend in green business, it marks a watershed
moment where leaders of commanding heights enterprises
recognized the strategic imperative of climate change adap-
tation on a global stage. The 2017 report “Better Business
Better World” published by the Business and Sustainable
DevelopmentCommission identifies theUNSustainableDe-
velopment Goals (SDGs) as providing a transformative
framework for business to foster sustainable development
imperatives in our current and evolving economic system.88
It is hoped that continued climate-conscious leadership, in-
ternationally and nationally, could be an imperative for the
UK to foster economic growth and innovation through their
first-mover advantage in GHG reductions. Brexit makes this
kind of leadership more, not less difficult.
International capital markets have also begun to respond
to climate-related risk exposure. In December 2016 the Task
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures – a 32-mem-
ber Task Force established by G20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors under the Financial Stability Board
andchairedbyMichael Bloomberg–put forwardguidelines,
binding on large assets owners (banks, insurance compa-
nies and asset managers/owner), recommending publica-
tionof climate-related financialdisclosure inpublic filings.89
Coincidentally, in February 2017 Deutsche Bank announced
itwouldhalt all financing to coal-firedpowerplant construc-
tion as part of their commitments under the Paris Agree-
ment, and building on a 2014 step to pull financing from a
proposed coal port which had impacts on the Great Barrier
Reef.90Thismovemirrors an increasing trend in investment
funds to divest fossil fuel intensive assets, with Arabella Ad-
80 UK, Climate Change Act 2008, c.27, Section 1, online: http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/pdfs/ukpga_20080027_en.pdf, [Cli-
mate Change Act].
81 Ibid, Climate Change Act, Section 24.
82 Ibid, Climate Change Act, Section 4-5.
83 UK Statistics 2017, supra note 68, at 9-10.
84 Ibid, UK Statistics 2017, at 19-24.
85 Ibid, UK Statistics 2017, at 5, 19, 30, 36.
86 Office for National Statistics, “Gross Domestic Product: chained vol-
umemeasures: Seasonally adjusted £m (1955–2016)” (Dataset: Second
Estimate of GDP time series dataset, 2017), online: https://www.ons.gov
.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/timeseries/abmi/pn2; Office
for National Statistics, “UK Perspectives 2016: The UK in a European
context” (26 May 2016), online: http://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk
-perspectives-2016-the-uk-in-an-european-context/. Office for Nation-
al Statistics, “Second estimate of GDP: Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2016”
Statistical Bulletin, (22 February 2017), online: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/bulletins/secondestimateofgdp/
quarter4octtodec2016.
87 Breakthrough Energy, “Coalition, Who we are,” online: http://www.b-t
.energy/coalition/; David Goldman, “The 30 rich and powerful people
Bill Gates signed on to save the Earth” CNN (30 November 2015), on-
line: http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/30/technology/bill-gates-climate
-change/.
88 Business and Sustainable Development Commission, “Better Business
Better World” (London: Business and Sustainable Development Com-
mission, 2017), online: http://report.businesscommission.org/uploads/
BetterBiz-BetterWorld.pdf [BSDC Report 2017]; UN, Transforming our
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/70/L.1, 18
September 2015, online: UN http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc
.asp?symbol=A/70/L.1&Lang=E, [2030 Agenda, SDGs].
89 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, “Recommenda-
tions of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures” (14
December 2016), online: https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/16_1221_TCFD_Report_Letter.pdf, [Climate-related
Financial Disclosures 2016, Carney- Bloomberg].
90 Agence France-Presse, “DeutscheBank pulls out of coal projects tomeet
Paris climate pledge” The Guardian (1 February 2017), online: https://
www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/01/deutsche-bank-pulls-out
-of-coal-projects-to-meet-paris-climate-pledge; Australian Associated
Press, “Germany's biggest bank pulls funding for Abbot Point coal ter-
minal” The Guardian (23 May 2014), online: https://www.theguardian
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visors noting a committed divestment asset value of $5.2tn
in December of 2016.91 Prior to Brexit it was the Bank of
England that issued the first comprehensive climate report,
requesting that companies should disclose their climate ex-
posure.92 It is doubtful if the Bank of England would still
trail blaze with the same vigor post-Brexit.
While Brexit uncertainty remains, climate change policy
imperatives transcend EU membership and should inform
plausible legal reforms tomaintain economic growth. Inter-
national responses to climate change are reaching an inflec-
tion point of mutual supportiveness, with over 850 climate
laws and policies identified at the national level.93 This
strong global commitment supports continued prioritiza-
tion of lower-carbon policies, buttressed by appropriate le-
gal and governance institutions to support innovation. Ob-
servers hope that climate change will remain a policy driver
if not because it is an environmental imperative, but because
to deviate from the global economic shift would leave open
UK-based organizations to unfavorable exposure to other-
wise avoidable climate-related risk. If the UK carbon bud-
get continues to inform and prioritize policy decisions post-
Brexit, the UK canmaintain international influence and dri-
ve adomestic environmental agendaprioritizing innovation
in the green economy.
Inmany areas, the UK, either thorough the “Great Repeal
Bill” or because of export pressure, will continue to be a par-
ticipant (perhaps spectator) inEUenvironmental law.While
domestic pressurewill aim tode-regulate, exporters, traders,
service providers and even the financial industry will try to
keep environmental standards as close to the EU level as
possible. While changes in the areas of agriculture and fish-
erieswere sold to the electorate as the great prospect of Brex-
it, in February 2017 the UK government announced that it
will continue to comply with EU fisheries policies and quo-
tas for the foreseeable future,94 prioritizing ensuring trade
within the European market as a Brexit imparative.95 As
such it is fair to conclude that Brexit does not solve a single
significant environmental problem but rather makes their
solution more complicated.
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